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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
 
 Plaintiff Chrysoula J. Komis, a former federal 
employee, brought Title VII retaliation and retaliatory hostile 
work environment claims against the Secretary of Labor. The 
trial court granted judgment as a matter of law for the Secretary 
on the discrete retaliation claim, and Komis did not appeal. The 
retaliatory hostile work environment claim went before a jury, 
which returned a verdict for the Secretary. Komis appeals that 
verdict, challenging the jury instructions. 
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This appeal requires us to decide whether federal 
employees may bring retaliation claims under Title VII. We 
conclude they may. We are then asked to consider whether the 
same standard governs federal- and private- sector retaliation 
claims, and what standard in particular applies to a federal 
retaliatory hostile work environment claim in light of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe 
Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006). We need not resolve 
these questions, however, because Komis cannot prevail under 
any potentially applicable standard. Accordingly, any error in 
the jury instructions was harmless. We will affirm.  
 
I. 
 Between June 2003 and September 2008, Komis filed 
more than sixty Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) 
complaints while employed by the Department of Labor’s 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). 
Allegedly in retaliation for those and other EEO complaints 
filed a decade earlier,1 Komis contends her employer created a 
hostile work environment. Specifically, she alleges (inter alia) 
her supervisors: (1) denied her the ability to work regularly 
from home; (2) shifted her job duties to include more clerical 
work; (3) reassigned her to a different position; and (4) failed 
to promote her to Assistant Regional Administrator, instead 
selecting attorney Maureen Russo. Komis further alleges (5) 
once Russo became her immediate supervisor, Russo 
improperly disciplined her in retaliation for making additional 
                                              
1 In the 1990s, Komis filed EEO complaints for sex 
discrimination and for unfair denial of the opportunity to work 
remotely, all of which were resolved in Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) settlements.  
4 
 
discrimination claims. The disciplinary actions at issue include 
a written reprimand, suspension, denial of access to training 
opportunities, and removal from a particular assignment. We 
observe that all the hostile acts Komis alleges appear to be 
discrete personnel actions altering the terms and conditions of 
her employment. 
 
In August 2008, Komis was issued a notice of proposed 
removal, informing her of OSHA’s decision to terminate her 
employment and providing her an opportunity to respond. 
Komis left OSHA in September 2008 and filed the last of her 
EEO complaints, alleging constructive discharge.  
 
In October 2008, Komis sued the Secretary of Labor, 
alleging OSHA violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). She brought two claims: (1) a 
retaliation claim based on her nonselection for promotion; and 
(2) a retaliatory hostile work environment claim. By consent, 
the matter was tried before a Magistrate Judge. As noted, at the 
close of Komis’s case, the trial judge granted the Secretary 
judgment as a matter of law on Komis’s discrete retaliation 
claim. Komis did not appeal that judgment. The retaliatory 
hostile work environment claim proceeded to the jury, which 
returned a verdict in the Secretary’s favor. Komis now 
challenges the jury charge on appeal.2  
 
                                              
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. “[O]ur review is plenary when the issue is 
whether the instructions misstated the law.” Armstrong v. 
Burdette Tomlin Mem’l Hosp., 438 F.3d 240, 245 (3d Cir. 
2006). 
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II. 
The parties dispute whether the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Burlington Northern v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006), 
renders the trial court’s federal-sector retaliatory hostile work 
environment charge erroneous, and we must ultimately decide 
whether the alleged error was harmless. Before addressing 
those questions, we first review Title VII’s framework for 
discrimination and retaliation claims in the private and federal 
sectors. 
 
The “core antidiscrimination provision” of Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, id. at 61, provides that in the 
private sector, “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice 
for an employer”: 
 
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against 
any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin;  
 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added). To state a claim 
for relief under Title VII’s antidiscrimination provision, 
plaintiffs must show “an action by an employer that is serious 
and tangible enough to alter an employee’s compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” Jones v. Se. 
Pa. Transp. Auth., 796 F.3d 323, 326 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting 
Storey v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 390 F.3d 760, 764 (3d Cir. 
2004)). “That definition stems from the language of Title VII 
itself.” Storey, 390 F.3d at 764. “[A]lthough the statute 
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mentions specific employment decisions with immediate 
consequences, the scope of the prohibition ‘is not limited to 
‘economic’ or ‘tangible’ discrimination,’ . . . and . . . it covers 
more than ‘“terms” and “conditions” in the narrow contractual 
sense.’” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 
(1998) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 
21 (1993), and Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 
U.S. 75, 78 (1998)); see also Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. 
Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115–16 (2002).  
 
Title VII’s private sector provisions also bar retaliation. 
While a discrimination claim under Title VII alleges 
discrimination on the basis of one’s race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin, a retaliation claim alleges discrimination on 
the basis of protected conduct: 
 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for 
an employer to discriminate against any of his 
employees or applicants for 
employment . . . because [the employee] has 
opposed any practice made an unlawful 
employment practice by this subchapter, or 
because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, 
or participated in any manner in an investigation, 
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Unlike the antidiscrimination 
provision, the antiretaliation provision is not limited to 
employer action that affects the terms and conditions of a 
claimant’s employment. As the Supreme Court explained in 
Burlington Northern, “[a]n employer can effectively retaliate 
against an employee by taking actions not directly related to 
his employment or by causing him harm outside the 
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workplace.” 548 U.S. at 63. To make out a claim of retaliation, 
a private-sector plaintiff must show “that a reasonable 
employee would have found the challenged action materially 
adverse, which in this context means it well might have 
dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a 
charge of discrimination.” Id. at 68 (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted).  
 
Under both the private-sector discrimination and 
retaliation provisions, §§ 2000e-2(a) and 2000e-3(a), 
employees may bring claims of a hostile work environment. 
Discussing a discriminatory hostile work environment, the 
Supreme Court has explained “[w]orkplace conduct is not 
measured in isolation,” so when a workplace “is permeated 
with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult[] that is 
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the 
victim’s employment and create an abusive working 
environment, Title VII is violated.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 116 
(quoting Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270 
(2001), and Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). We held in Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444 (3d Cir. 
2006), decided before Burlington Northern, “our usual 
[discriminatory] hostile work environment framework applies 
equally” to claims of retaliatory hostile work environments. Id. 
at 449. That framework requires a plaintiff prove: 
 
(1) [S]he suffered intentional discrimination 
because of her protected activity; (2) the 
discrimination was severe or pervasive; (3) the 
discrimination detrimentally affected her; (4) it 
would have detrimentally affected a reasonable 
person in like circumstances; and (5) a basis for 
employer liability is present. 
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Id. (internal citations omitted). The inquiry into whether the 
discriminatory or retaliatory environment was “severe or 
pervasive” recognizes that less severe isolated incidents which 
would not themselves rise to the level of retaliation may, when 
taken together as part of “the overall scenario,” evidence 
retaliatory animus, and one severe incident may be enough to 
create a hostile work environment. Id. at 450 (quoting Andrews 
v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1484 (3d Cir. 1990)); 
see Castleberry v. STI Grp., 863 F.3d 259, 264 (3d Cir. 2017).  
 
 In 1972, Congress extended Title VII’s protections to 
federal employees in § 2000e-16(a), which provides: 
 
All personnel actions affecting [federal] 
employees or applicants for [federal] 
employment . . . shall be made free from any 
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin. 
 
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-
261, sec. 11, § 717(a), 86 Stat. 103, 111 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a)). “In general, it may be said that the 
substantive anti-discrimination law embraced in Title VII was 
carried over and applied to the Federal Government.” Morton 
v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 547 (1974) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 
92-238, at 22 (1971), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 
2157). “Congress intended to provide federal employees with 
the full rights available in the courts as are granted to 
individuals in the private sector under Title VII.” Loeffler v. 
Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 559 (1988) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
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III. 
Below, we first clarify that federal employees may bring 
claims for retaliation under Title VII even though the federal-
sector provision does not explicitly reference retaliation. While 
the government then asserts federal-sector retaliation claims 
are, unlike their private-sector counterparts, limited to 
challenging “personnel actions,” we conclude this case does 
not give occasion to address that contention.   
 
A. 
 The government does not contest and in fact accepts our 
longstanding view—shared by every circuit to consider the 
question—that federal employees may bring claims of 
retaliation under Title VII. See, e.g., Andreoli v. Gates, 482 
F.3d 641, 649–50 (3d Cir. 2007); Jensen, 435 F.3d at 449, 
abrogated on other grounds by Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 53.3 
Although the language of § 2000e-16(a) differs from the 
language of the private-sector antidiscrimination and 
antiretaliation provisions, many courts have consistently 
interpreted § 2000e-16(a) “to give federal employees the same 
rights as private employees.” Porter v. Adams, 639 F.2d 273, 
277–78 (5th Cir. 1981); see also White v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 
652 F.2d 913, 917 (9th Cir. 1981); Hackley v. Roudebush, 520 
                                              
3 Accord Blomker v. Jewell, 831 F.3d 1051, 1054 (8th Cir. 
2016); Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 384 (4th Cir. 2011); 
DeCaire v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2008); Rochon v. 
Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1215 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Ray v. 
Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1237 (9th Cir. 2000); Hale v. 
Marsh, 808 F.2d 616, 619 (7th Cir. 1986).  
10 
 
F.2d 108, 142 n.138 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Parks v. Dunlop, 517 
F.2d 785, 787 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam). 
 
Were there any doubt that federal employees may bring 
retaliation claims under Title VII, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474 (2008), 
dispels it. In Gomez-Perez, the Supreme Court addressed 
whether the federal-sector provision added in 1974 to the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) prohibits 
retaliation by the federal government. See 553 U.S. at 487. 
Significantly, the ADEA was “patterned directly after Title 
VII’s federal-sector discrimination ban,” id. (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted), and the text of the ADEA and Title 
VII federal-sector provisions is nearly identical. Compare 
ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a) (“All personnel actions affecting 
employees or applicants for employment who are at least 40 
years of age . . . shall be made free from any discrimination 
based on age.” (emphasis added)), with Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-16(a) (“All personnel actions affecting employees or 
applicants for employment . . . shall be made free from any 
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.” (emphasis added)). 
 
In Gomez-Perez, the government argued § 633a(a) did 
not encompass retaliation claims because, unlike the ADEA’s 
private-sector provisions, the federal-sector provision does not 
specifically reference retaliation. See 553 U.S. at 486. That 
omission, the government contended, demonstrated Congress 
intended to prohibit only discrimination claims—not 
retaliation claims—in the federal sector. See id. The Supreme 
Court rejected the government’s narrow reading, instead 
concluding the federal-sector provision confers on federal 
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employees the right to bring retaliation claims. See id. at 491.4 
Because the text of the ADEA and Title VII federal-sector 
provisions is nearly identical, Gomez-Perez supports our 
conclusion that Title VII also bars retaliation in the federal 
sector.  
 
 Based on our previous recognition of such claims and 
the Supreme Court’s holding in Gomez-Perez, we reaffirm that 
federal employees may bring retaliation claims under Title VII. 
Parity between private-sector and federal-sector retaliation 
claims ensures “[a]ll personnel actions affecting [federal] 
employees . . . shall be made free from any discrimination,” 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). In continuing to recognize federal-
sector retaliation claims following Gomez-Perez, we join many 
of our sister circuits. See Coleman v. Duke, 867 F.3d 204, 215 
(D.C. Cir. 2017); Cabral v. Brennan, 853 F.3d 763, 767 (5th 
Cir. 2017); Green v. Donahoe, 760 F.3d 1135, 1146 (10th Cir. 
2014), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Green v. Brennan, 
                                              
4 In construing the ADEA’s federal-sector provision, the Court 
rejected arguments that the provision, as a waiver of sovereign 
immunity, must be strictly construed in favor of the 
government and that federal employees do not need the same 
protection as private employees against retaliation because 
they benefit from the protections under the Civil Service 
Reform Act (CSRA).  Gomez-Perez, 553 U.S. at 489–91; cf. 
id. at 503 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he view that 
Congress intended to treat retaliation for age discrimination 
complaints as a problem to be dealt with primarily through 
administrative procedures, rather than through the judicial 
process in the first instance, is confirmed by Congress’s 
passage of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), 92 
Stat. 1111.”).    
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136 S. Ct. 1769 (2016); AuBuchon v. Geithner, 743 F.3d 638, 
641–42 (8th Cir. 2014); Gowski v. Peake, 682 F.3d 1299, 1312 
(11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam); Morales-Vallellanes v. Potter, 
605 F.3d 27, 35–36 (1st Cir. 2010); Hunter v. Sec’y of U.S. 
Army, 565 F.3d 986, 996 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 
B. 
The government accepts that federal employees may 
bring retaliation claims, see Appellee’s Br. 16, but contends the 
Burlington Northern standard used for private-sector 
retaliation claims should not apply to retaliation claims in the 
federal sector. In Burlington Northern, the Court observed the 
text of the private-sector retaliation provision did not, unlike 
the private-sector discrimination provision, limit retaliation 
claims “to actions that affect employment or alter the 
conditions of the workplace.” 548 U.S. at 62. It accordingly 
determined the antiretaliation provision protects plaintiffs from 
conduct a “reasonable employee would have found . . . 
materially adverse,” employment-related or otherwise. Id. at 
68. According to the government, that material adversity 
standard is inapplicable to Komis because Title VII’s federal-
sector provision protects only against discrimination or 
retaliation as to “[a]ll personnel actions affecting employees,” 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). Although offering more than one 
definition of “personnel actions,” the government principally 
urges that we interpret “personnel actions” to mean “changes 
in the terms and conditions of employment,” i.e., the 
requirement for discrimination claims.5  Doing so would 
                                              
5 In its brief, the government refers to multiple possible 
definitions of “personnel action,” some of which are materially 
different. See Appellee’s Br. at 21 (suggesting a personnel 
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negate for federal employees Burlington Northern’s holding 
“that the antiretaliation provision, unlike the substantive 
                                              
action is an action “relating to the terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment”); id. (citing Page v. Bolger, 645 
F.2d 227, 233 (4th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (holding “personnel 
actions” contemplate “ultimate employment decisions such as 
hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and 
compensating”)); id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii) 
(defining “personnel action” in the civil service context to 
include any “significant change in duties, responsibilities, or 
working conditions”)).  
But in Page, the Fourth Circuit drew its definition of a 
“personnel action” for a discrimination claim from the actions 
covered by § 2000e-2(a). 645 F.2d at 233 (“Disparate 
treatment theory as it has emerged in application of this and 
comparable provisions of Title VII, most notably § 703(a)(1), 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), has consistently focused on the 
question whether there has been discrimination in what could 
be characterized as ultimate employment decisions such as 
hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and 
compensating. This is the general level of decision we think 
contemplated by the term ‘personnel actions’ in 
[§ 2000e-16].”). Because Page involved discrimination—not 
retaliation—claims, it is inapposite here. 
As to the government’s contention that we should adopt the 
definition of “personnel action” contained in 5 U.S.C. 
§ 2302(a)(2)(A), the text of § 2302(a)(2)(A) explicitly limits 
that definition to the section, and so we do not believe its reach 
extends to Title VII’s federal-sector provision at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-16(a). 
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provision, is not limited to discriminatory actions that affect 
the terms and conditions of employment,” 548 U.S. at 64.  
 
Komis’s retaliatory hostile work environment claim 
does not require us to resolve all the parameters of the phrase 
“personnel action” in § 2000e-16(a), nor does it raise the 
question whether discrete retaliation claims that do not involve 
“personnel actions” are cognizable in the federal sector.6 As 
made clear by its plain terms, a retaliatory hostile work 
environment affects the conditions of the workplace. See 
Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 427 (2013). And as 
noted, all the hostile acts Komis alleges as part of that hostile 
environment are personnel actions potentially altering the 
terms and conditions of her employment. To that extent, then, 
we can recognize that the acts alleged here are personnel 
actions without deciding in this case whether the “personnel 
action” language in § 2000e-16(a) might differentiate federal-
sector from private-sector retaliation claims.7  
                                              
6 We note the government has unsuccessfully advanced this 
argument before. See, e.g., Rochon, 438 F.3d at 1216–19 
(“[W]e must consider whether . . . the general ban on retaliation 
in § 2000e-3(a) is limited by the requirement in § 2000e-16(a) 
that ‘[a]ll [government] personnel actions’ be made free from 
discrimination. We do not believe the prohibition is so 
qualified.”); see also Hale, 808 F.2d at 619 (analyzing a federal 
employee’s Title VII retaliation claim without conducting a 
separate “personnel action” inquiry); Ayon v. Sampson, 547 
F.2d 446, 449 (9th Cir. 1976) (similar).   
 
7 The government also raises this argument for the first time on 
appeal, and our general practice is not to consider arguments 
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IV. 
Given the legal background discussed above, Komis’s 
appeal comes down to whether the following jury instructions 
were erroneous: 
 
OSHA is liable if Ms. Komis proves all of 
the following elements by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  
First, Ms. Komis was subjected to 
retaliation or harassment by her co-workers, 
supervisors, and/or managers.  
. . .  
Third, the co-workers[’], supervisors[’] 
and/or managers[’] conduct was motivated by 
the fact that Ms. Komis had complained of 
discrimination or retaliation. 
Fourth, the co-workers[’], supervisors[’] 
and managers[’] conduct was so severe or 
pervasive that a reasonable person in Ms. 
Komis’[s] position would find her work 
environment hostile or abusive.  
. . .  
Sixth, Ms. Komis suffered a materially 
adverse action as a result of the hostile work 
environment, meaning a reasonable worker 
would have been dissuaded from making or 
                                              
the parties failed to raise before the trial court. See Harris v. 
City of Philadelphia, 35 F.3d 840, 845 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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supporting a charge of discrimination or 
retaliation.  
. . . 
A hostile work environment exists under 
the law only if there is extreme conduct 
amounting to a material change in the terms and 
conditions of employment . . . . [I]solated 
incidents unless extremely serious will not 
amount to a hostile work environment under law. 
App’x 21–24 (emphasis added). The court also listed for the 
jury several “factors” to “consider when determining and 
deciding whether the hostile work environment existed,” 
including the “total physical environment” of Komis’s 
workplace, the “frequency of the offensive conduct,” the 
“severity of the conduct,” and the “effect of the working 
environment on Ms. Komis’[s] mental and emotional well-
being.” App’x 23.  
 
Komis specifically contends the trial court’s instruction 
that a retaliatory hostile work environment claim requires 
proof of “conduct . . . so severe or pervasive that a reasonable 
person in Ms. Komis’[s] position would find her work 
environment hostile or abusive,” App’x 22, was erroneous 
because Burlington Northern did away with the “severe or 
pervasive” requirement for retaliation claims—including for a 
retaliatory hostile work environment. Instead, she maintains, 
the jury should have been instructed only on the material 
adversity standard articulated in the sixth element of the court’s 
instructions.  
 
“When a jury instruction is erroneous, a new trial is 
warranted unless such error is harmless.” Harvey v. Plains Tp. 
17 
 
Police Dep’t, 635 F.3d 606, 612 (3d Cir. 2011). In a civil case, 
an error is harmless if “it is highly probable that the error did 
not contribute to the judgment.” Id. (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted). Based on the full record, we are 
confident that in this case “the jury would have reached the 
same result had it been instructed according to” Komis’s 
desired instruction. Murray v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 
145 F.3d 143, 156–57 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
Komis’s claim turns on the difference between the 
“severe or pervasive” standard and the “materially adverse” 
standard.8 As noted, we first applied the “severe or pervasive” 
standard to retaliatory hostile work environment claims in the 
private sector under Title VII in Jensen, where we explained 
the relevant inquiry was:  “[D]id the plaintiff suffer retaliatory 
harassment severe or pervasive enough to ‘alter the conditions 
of [her] employment and create an abusive working 
                                              
8 Komis in fact focuses on the difference between the 
“materially adverse” standard and a “severe and pervasive” 
standard. Rather than “severe and pervasive,” however, the 
correct standard would be “severe or pervasive”: “‘[S]everity’ 
and ‘pervasiveness’ are alternative possibilities: some 
harassment may be severe enough to contaminate an 
environment even if not pervasive; other, less objectionable, 
conduct will contaminate the workplace only if it is pervasive,” 
Castleberry, 863 F.3d at 264 (internal quotation and citation 
omitted); see also Jensen, 435 F.3d at 449 n.3. The trial court 
therefore appropriately instructed the jury to consider whether 
Komis faced “severe or pervasive” retaliation in the form of a 
hostile work environment. See App’x 22, Supplemental App’x 
868 (emphasis added). 
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environment?’” 453 F.3d at 451 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, 
FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)). 
 
 The Supreme Court then introduced the “materially 
adverse” standard in Burlington Northern, a case involving a 
private-sector claim of retaliation (but not raising any claim of 
a retaliatory hostile work environment). That decision laid out 
the difference in “scope” of discrimination and retaliation 
claims. 548 U.S. at 67. The Court reasoned that “[t]he 
[antidiscrimination] provision seeks to prevent injury to 
individuals based on who they are, i.e., their status. The 
antiretaliation provision seeks to prevent harm to individuals 
based on what they do, i.e., their conduct.” Id. at 63. Because 
“one cannot secure the second objective by focusing only upon 
employer actions and harm that concern employment and the 
workplace,” the “antiretaliation provision, unlike the 
substantive [antidiscrimination] provision, is not limited to 
discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions of 
employment.” Id. at 63–64. The Court accordingly held a 
plaintiff who asserts a discrete retaliation claim need show only 
“that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged 
action materially adverse, which in this context means it well 
might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or 
supporting a charge of discrimination.” Id. at 68 (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). We have applied 
Burlington Northern’s standard to discrete retaliation claims in 
the private sector, see Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 
331, 341 (3d. Cir. 2006), and some of our fellow circuits have 
done so in federal-sector discrete retaliation cases, see, e.g., 
Lapka v. Chertoff, 517 F.3d 974, 985–86 (7th Cir. 2008); 
Patterson v. Johnson, 505 F.3d 1296, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 2007).   
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 Komis seeks to apply that standard to her federal-sector 
claim of a retaliatory hostile work environment. All of the 
conduct that Komis alleges created a hostile work 
environment—for example, changes in her job duties and 
assignment to a different position—flows from “employment 
and the workplace,” Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. 63. Komis 
accordingly does not claim the instruction failed to account for 
Burlington Northern’s recognition of conduct outside the 
workplace. Instead, she contends the court set too high the level 
of harm she had to prove in instructing the jury that a hostile 
work environment required conduct severe or pervasive 
enough to change the terms and conditions of her employment 
rather than simply conduct that was materially adverse. 
 
Whatever the room in magnitude of harm between 
conduct severe or pervasive such that it affects the terms and 
conditions of employment and materially adverse conduct that 
would dissuade a reasonable worker from invoking her 
antidiscrimination rights, Komis has not shown how it might 
change the outcome in her case.9 The “material adversity” 
standard “separate[s] significant from trivial harms,” 
                                              
9 We observe several Courts of Appeals continue to ask 
whether the claimant’s workplace is permeated with conduct 
severe or pervasive enough to change the conditions of the 
claimant’s employment in reviewing Title VII retaliatory 
hostile work environment cases after Burlington Northern. See 
Flanagan v. Office of Chief Judge, 893 F.3d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 
2018); Duplan v. City of New York, 888 F.3d 612, 627 (2d Cir. 
2018); Baird v. Gotbaum, 792 F.3d 166, 168–69, 171–72 (D.C. 
Cir. 2015); Maldonado-Cátala v. Municipality of Naranjito, 
876 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2017); Gowski, 682 F.3d at 1311.   
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Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 68, and unquestionably 
leaves in place a plaintiff’s burden to show the allegedly hostile 
work environment was motivated by retaliatory animus, see 
Jensen, 435 F.3d at 452 (“[W]hile we must consider the totality 
of the circumstances, some circumstances do not affect our 
analysis because they are not retaliatory.”). Komis does not 
explain why the jury would have determined the harms alleged 
by her sixty-some EEO claims taken together were not severe 
or pervasive enough to effect the terms and conditions of her 
work, yet were materially adverse enough to dissuade a 
reasonable person from making a charge of discrimination.  
 
The government further offers the compelling argument 
that Komis failed at trial to offer facts establishing a retaliatory 
hostile work environment because many of her claims lacked 
a causal connection to protected conduct. See Moore, 461 F.3d 
at 340–42. Komis, for instance, contends one of the incidents 
creating a retaliatory hostile work environment was her 
supervisor Russo’s decision to deny her request to work 
regularly at home—but Komis had last filed an EEO claim in 
1993, and offered no reason to think Russo’s decision to deny 
that request in 2003 was made in retaliation for her decade-old 
EEO claim. Given that no other employee in Komis’s office 
was given permission to work regularly at home, the decision 
not to give Komis such unique dispensation does not appear 
materially adverse or even objectionable. In another example, 
Komis alleged Russo unfairly disciplined her, but several of 
those allegedly retaliatory incidents took place before Russo 
knew Komis had filed EEO complaints, again undermining the 
notion that the discipline was issued in retaliation for protected 
conduct.  
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Moreover, Komis fails to rebut the government’s 
legitimate, non-retaliatory explanations for the alleged 
retaliatory conduct as required under the framework 
established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 
792 (1973). Komis claims that as a result of her filing 
discrimination complaints with the EEOC, her job duties were 
changed and she was given the work of a clerk. She also claims 
she was subjected to harsher punishment. The government 
offered overwhelming evidence that (1) there were fewer 
industrial hygiene assignments overall, (2) Komis’s Voluntary 
Protection Program (VPP) duties made it difficult to schedule 
Komis for such assignments, (3) OSHA’s focus shifted under 
a new presidential administration, (4) her three suspensions 
were proper disciplinary actions appropriate for Komis’s 
infractions of direct insubordination and forwarding of internal 
OSHA emails outside the agency, and (5) clerical duties were 
actually part of her job description from the time she took the 
position. Komis failed to offer any evidence rebutting these 
justifications. On appeal, she offers hardly any fact-based 
response at all to the government’s claim of harmless error. We 
thus conclude that any error in the jury instruction was 
harmless. 
 
VI. 
For the reasons provided, we will affirm the judgment 
of the trial court. 
